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Abstract
Compatibility between the realist tenants of value-definiteness and causal-
ity is called into question by several realism impossibility proofs in which their
formal elements are shown to conflict. We review how this comes about in
the Kochen-Specker and von Neumann proofs and point out a connection be-
tween their key assumptions: a constraint on realist causality via additivity
in the latter proof, noncontextuality in the former. We conclude that value-
definiteness and contextuality are indeed not mutually exclusive.
1 overview
In contrast to Bell’s theorem which draws a contradiction between the predictions
of quantum mechanics and realism, the theorem of Kochen and Specker (KS), ”the
second important no-go theory against hidden variable theories”, rather calls into
question the very logic in realist thinking. The argument is directed against a brand
of realism characterized by value-definiteness and noncontextuality, formulated here
in section 6.1 as propositions p(1) and p(2), respectively. When these are applied
to an elementary QM description of spin-1 particle measurements, a contradiction
known as the KS paradox follows.
In the concluding view of this article, proposition p(2) does not follow from any
realist principle and is even anti-realist in the undue constraint it places on causality.
Moreover, no realist to the writer’s knowledge lays claim to it. As this question
concerns the views of realists, it might well be put to rest with a few excerpts from
the writings of well-known realist thinkers. But that would fall short of our broader
aim to explain how the misunderstanding of a realist p(2) could have come about,
and thus point the way to a reasoned resolution. To this end, we consider the two
principal interpretations of quantum mechanics, orthodox and realist, with special
attention to their contrasting physical interpretations of the QM wave-function; our
approach to the KS paradox is within this context.
We also take the view that the paradox may be well understood from basic quantum
mechanics, and so first set about reminding the reader of the relevant elements
that he or she may already know from an elementary study of the subject. In
section 2 we motivate the discussion of discrete possessed values by considering the
quantum signature Stern-Gerlach experimental data, which, in section 3, is described
within the framework of quantum mechanics. There, the operational equations and
constraints necessary to the KS paradox first appear, equations (18). We then
consider in section 4 features of the orthodox interpretation relevant to the evaluation
of the equations: In 4.1 the orthodox identification of the QM wave-function with
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individual particle states from which follows in 4.2 its view with regard to individual
particle possessed-values. Section 5 deals with the realist interpretation, there too,
particularly regarding features relevant to evaluation of equations (18). At the
heart of the interpretation is the realist identification of the QM wave function with
collections of particles, particle ensembles.
The KS paradox is derived in section 6 from propositions p(1) and p(2) applied
to the set (18). The connection to the older von Neumann impossibility proof is
established in 6.2 and to the later work of Gleason in 6.3. We reconsider the KS
paradox in section 7 by close examination of premise p(2). In the end we find little
justification for proposition p(2) as a realist tenet, and indeed from the words of
realist thinkers, evidence to the contrary. We conclude with an attempt to explain
the natural simplicity of contextuality in realist thinking.
2 Stern-Gerlach Data
From the data of Stern-Gerlach (SG) measurements comes a persuasive case that
only certain discrete values of intrinsic angular momentum, spin, are observable.
There, a stream of unprepared electrons enter and exit a small region of intense
inhomogeneous magnetic field strength where it divides in two, half the electrons
deflecting up, the other half down by the same set magnitude [1] proportional to
a given electron’s spin projection along the SG apparatus symmetry axis. Thus
measured, each spin projection is found to have one of the two values, ±1
2
, for
which reason the electron is called a spin- 1
2
particle. A second measurement along
the same SG axis taken on either of the two sub-ensembles invariably confirm the
previous result: electrons previously deflected up (down) due to positive (negative)
spin of magnitude 1
2
along the axis, are again deflected up (down)
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where Bˆ in figure 1 gives the averaged SG B-field direction. As the pre-measured spin
orientations are assumed random, isotropically distributed and uncorrelated to the
orientation of the measuring apparatus, this phenomena is unexpected. One would
from classical considerations expect the deflection magnitudes to vary continuously
with the relative spin-to-apparatus angle
d ∝ sz = s cosφ (1)
having maximum and minimum values for φ = 0&pi
2
, respectively
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One finds however that when the apparatus itself is re-oriented (to test against
apparatus-to-ensemble correlation), the same result obtains
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half electrons deflecting up again by the same magnitude as before, half down, only
now along the re-oriented axis. Moreover, when this second measurement is taken
along an axis perpendicular to the first, again, half are deflected up, half down,
by the same magnitude. Indeed, one finds that no matter the SG orientation or
the order in which one appears in a sequence of such measurements, the results
are always +1
2
or −1
2
only . The electron’s spin projection is therefore said to be
quantized (i.e., given in discrete, set amounts) along the measurement axis, called
then the axis of quantization, in the figure below the SG symmetry axis specified
by θ and θ′, SG orientations relative to the laboratory z-axis.
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The phenomena poses a difficulty to ordinary intuition. Imagine e.g. that whenever
you looked up at the moon its polar tilt (as measured from the plane of sight) varied
in 180o increments only
6
no matter the orientation of your head (as measured from the local earth plane).
figure 5
The moon’s angular momentum would then be said to be quantized.... For the
electron this and other unusual microscopic phenomena are well described by the
Physics of small-scales, quantum mechanics.
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3 quantum mechanical description
Relative frequencies for each of the spin-up, spin-down classes of electron data de-
scribed above may be obtained from the formalism of quantum mechanics. Exper-
imentally, the frequencies are statistical probabilities over ensembles, collections of
identical elements, strictly valid in the large ensemble limit. As regards individual
measurements, however, the theory makes no prediction 1. The up (down) deflection
probability at apparatus θ for a sub-ensemble of electrons previously deflected up
at apparatus θ′ is given by cos2 φ
2
( sin2 φ
2
), φ ≡ θ − θ′, assuming for simplicity SG
rotation with respect to the laboratory y-axis.
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These probabilities are expectation values of projector operators Pθ± in a complex
Hilbert space of state vectors |Ψ〉 whose calculation proceeds as follows:
〈Pθ±〉 =θ′ 〈+|Pθ±|+〉θ′ =


cos2 φ
2
sin2 φ
2
(2)
1See e.g. ref. [2, p. 31] and ref. [3, p. 2]
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where
|+〉θ = cos θ
2
|+〉+ sin θ
2
|−〉 (3)
Pθ± = |±〉θ θ〈±| (4)
with relations
〈±|±〉 = 1
〈±|∓〉 = 0. (5)
For deflected-down prepared subensemble predictions, vector |+〉θ′ in (2) is replaced
by |−〉θ′ = cos θ′2 |−〉 − sin θ
′
2
|+〉.
Spin-up/spin-down vectors, |±〉 , are so-called by analogy with the relation between
ordinary classical spin vectors, s±, and what would be their SG deflections. However
in the two-dimensional Hilbert space H2 which they span, the directions of |±〉
are not antiparallel, but mutually perpendicular, corresponding to dual, mutually
exclusive experimental outcomes.
x y
z
s
+
s
−
|+>
|->
|+>O−
|−>O−
O-/2
H2
figure 7
Given projectors Pθ± , both vectors are completely specified by relations
Pθ±|±〉θ = (1) · |±〉θ = |±〉θ
Pθ±|∓〉θ = (0) · |∓〉θ = 0 (6)
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called eigenvalue (proper- value) relations, where (6) states that |+〉θ is an eigenvec-
tor of both projector operators Pθ+ and Pθ− having eigenvalues 1 and 0, respectively;
these are sometimes called ”yes” and ”no” eigenvalues, and projectors, accordingly,
yes-no operators. In consequence, |±〉θ are also eigenvectors of the quantum me-
chanical spin operator, Sθ =
1
2
(Pθ+ − Pθ−) , having eigenvalues ±12
Sθ|±〉θ = ±1
2
|±〉θ (7)
which gives immediately that the vectors |±〉θ′ with θ′ 6= θ are generally not spin Sθ
eigenvectors.
Vectors and operators may also be expressed in 2-dimentional matrix form
|+〉θ =

 cos
θ
2
sin θ
2

 |−〉θ =

 − sin
θ
2
cos θ
2

 (8)
Pθ+ =

 cos
2 θ
2
1
2
sin θ
1
2
sin θ sin2 θ
2

 Pθ− =

 sin
2 θ
2
−1
2
sin θ
−1
2
sin θ cos2 θ
2

 (9)
whereby relations (2), (5), and (6) above are of course preserved. In addition, for
each quantization θ we have the projector relations
Pθ+ + Pθ− =

 1 0
0 1

 ≡ 1 (10)
P2θ± = Pθ± (11)
known respectively as completion and projector conditions. Their symbolic evalua-
tion over the ensemble yields the expectation value equation
〈Pθ+〉θ + 〈Pθ−〉θ = 1 (12)
with constraint
〈Pθ±〉θ = 1 or 0 . (13)
It is sometimes of interest to compare sets of eigenvector pairs for selected quanti-
zations. From (8) we tabulate for orientations {θ} = {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2}.
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θ|+ >θ
|− >θ
 0 
(1,0)
(0,1)
 pi/2 
(1,1)/√2
(−1,1)/√2
 pi 
(0,1)
(−1,0)
3pi/2
(−1,1)/√2
(−1,−1)/√2
table 1
Notice that eigenstates are not necessarily exclusive to single orientations: |−〉pi/2 =
|+〉3pi/2, so that e.g. from (4), Ppi/2− = P3pi/2+. As the ambiguity is significant to
the coming discussion, for emphasis we now make a notational change. We specify
a Hilbert space eigenstate now by the spatial direction of its classical counterpart,
one related to the other as illustrated in figure (7). Then, |±〉θ′ ∼ |s′±〉. P′i thus
projects out the QM state with classical counterpart s′i measured by an SG apparatus
with orientation θ′, which, interchangeably with the corresponding average SG field
direction Bˆ′, we shall call the measurement’s context. The two notations are related
by
Bˆ′ · kˆ = cos(θ′)
sˆ′1,2 ≡ sˆ′+,− = +,−Bˆ′
P′1,2 = Pθ′+,− (14)
We therefore have from table 1
P
(pi/2)
2 = P
(3pi/2)
1 (15)
consequent upon s
(pi/2)
2 = s
(3pi/2)
1 (= iˆ): The spin-down SG outcome state for SG
orientation θ = pi/2 is the same as the spin-up outcome state for SG orientation
θ = 3pi/2 . In the new notation table 1 becomes
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B|s1 >
|s2 >
k −i −k i
(1,0)
(0,1)
(1,1)/√2
(−1,1)/√2
(0,1)
(−1,0)
(−1,1)/√2
(−1,−1)/√2
table 2
For the purposes of the KS analysis here we will need to consider the structure
of measurement outcomes on spin-1 particles, measurements also made by the SG
apparatus. The observed mutually exclusive outcomes are: deflection up, deflection
down, and no deflection at all.
B
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In the now corresponding three dimensional Hilbert space of states we have operator
relations
P1 + P2 + P3 =


1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1

 ≡ 1 (16)
P2i = Pi (17)
and related expectation-value completion and projection relations
〈P1〉′ + 〈P2〉′ + 〈P3〉′ = 1
〈Pi〉′ = 1 or 0 for B′ = B (18)
a constrained sum rule (csr) central in the derivation of the KS paradox. Look-
ing ahead, we now tabulate the eigenvector triplets for the four contexts {B} =
{kˆ,−iˆ,−kˆ, iˆ}
B
|s1 >
|s2 >
|s3 >
k −i −k i
(1,0,0)
(0,1,0)
(0,0,1)
(1/√2,1,1/√2) 
(1,0,−1)
(1/√2,−1,1/√2)
(0,0,1)
(0,1,0)
(1,0,0)
(1/√2,−1,1/√2)
(1,0,1)
(1/√2,1,1/√2)
table 3
Table 3 and csr (18) taken together lend themselves to various physical interpre-
tations, most of which may be grouped into one of two main categories: orthodox
and realist. The KS contention detailed in section 6 is that an expanded table 3
(obtained simply by expanding the number of contexts considered) is not amenable
to any self-consistant realist interpretation; this is the KS paradox. For this reason,
we begin in the next two sections by considering such features of the two broad
interpretations as are relevant to the KS discussion.
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4 Orthodox interpretation of SG data and QM
description
4.1 Idea of the individual electron state
There are several ways in which the behavior of individual electrons under the in-
fluence of SG measurements is similar to that of quantum-mechanical spin eigen-
functions under the action of projector operators. As a prepared electron deflects
either up or down along a measuring SG axis, a projector operator will project an
arbitrary state Ψ into either a spin-up or a spin-down eigenstate characteristic of
the SG orientation Bˆ 2.
P|Ψ〉
−→
collapse |s1〉 or |s2〉 (19)
An electron spin prepared along a given measurement axis then will not be altered
upon measurement - a deflected up(down) prepared electron deflects up(down) again
- just as projector operators project their own eigenstates onto themselves. On the
other hand, if the prepared and measurement axis are not identical, the electron
deflects up or down with probability amplitude given by the corresponding state
projected eigenfunction coefficient
P′1,2|s1〉 =


cos φ
2
|s′1〉
sin φ
2
|s′2〉
(20)
illustrated
2The actual projection on an arbitrary state is by prescription only; a state is said to ”collapse”
upon measurement to one of the context’s eigenstates, though no entirely satisfactory dynamics
for the collapse has ever been worked out [4]. The shortcoming is closely related to the so-called
measurement problem in QM.
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And so one might well identify the quantum mechanical spin- 1
2
wave function |Ψ〉
with individual electron states, projector operators with the measuring apparatus,
and action of the operator on the wave function with the measuring process, just the
identifications in fact made in the conventional or orthodox interpretation of QM
3. While the assignments are largely unimportant to the practical workings of the
formalism, the calculation of expectation values, they offer a picture of the world of
individual electrons, a kind of metaphysics.
One difficulty with the interpretation is that spin-vectors are particular to their
quantization, having definite projections only along the quantized directions of their
measurement axis; in all other directions the projection is not well-defined. The
same then in this interpretation for the electron spin itself; the orthodox electron
does not possess a spin-projection along a given direction except upon measurement
(and prior to subsequent distinct measurements); unlike ordinary classical spin pro-
jections, an electron’s seems to exist only along one set of directions at a time.
3See e.g. ref. [1, pp. 108 & 214] .
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Another difficulty is that ”identical” electrons - those of a given ensemble and so
represented by the same spin function - generally exhibit different behaviors when
subjected to the same conditions: Some electrons of a deflected-up subensemble
e.g. will deflect up, others down, when their spin projections are measured along a
direction different from the preparation axis. The phenomena is at odds with the
principle of the identity of indiscernibles [5] (see also discussion in [6, p. 8], and
”sufficient reason” principle in [7, p. 266] ).
Finally, the probabilities of QM have meaning to the experimentalist only in refer-
ence to ensemble measurements. 4
4.2 Orthodox interpretation of csr (18)
The value of the expectation 〈Pi〉Ψ answers the question whether a particle in state
Ψ has a definite spin in context B : 1 or 0 for yes, no otherwise. From (18) we
see that the answer is ”yes” generally when the particle has been prepared within
the measurement context of interest, |Ψ〉 → |s′j〉 with B′ = B. But the answer
might also be yes for a different preparation context, B′ 6= B, provided the classical
companions to Hilbert space vectors |s′j〉 and |si〉, s′j & si, coincide for some i and j.
We illustrate such an instance
4see ref. [3, p. 2] and [2, p. 36]
16
HB
s1
s2
s3
B’
s1
’
s2
’
s3
’
figure 10
In this case the projection measurement with result corresponding to that for clas-
sical spin direction s2 = s
′
2 can be made within either context B or B
′ with equal
results, and is therefore said to be context independent (wrt contexts B and B′ ),
or noncontextual. A prepared particle |s′j〉 might therefore have a definite spin in
all contexts with quantization s′j and can be said to possess the corresponding set
of projector operator eigenvalues. In all other contexts its spin projections are not
definite, and the particle could not be said to possess the corresponding projector
eigenvalues.
It is easy to see that the number of noncontextuality constraints imposed by
this interpretation on a set of sum rules (18) corresponding to a large number of
contexts considered simultaneously would be relatively small. Not so in the realist
interpretation, as we shall see in the next section. It is this consequence of the
realist interpretation that the KS analysis in the section following exploits to draw
a self-contradiction.
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5 Realist interpretation of SG data and QM de-
scription
5.1 Deterministically-held possessed values and the realist
extension to csr (18)
In the realist view there is a sense in which an electron has definite spin projections
in all directions at all time; its physical characteristics combined with preparation
determines unambiguously whether an electron will deflect up or down in a given
Stern-Gerlach measurement, nothing left to chance. ”The good lord does not throw
dice”, is how Einstein is reported to have put it [7, p. 190]. Then, in the event
that otherwise identical electrons have different deflections their preparations, their
causal histories, must also have been different.
In this sense it might be said that an electron is in possession of a deflection value,
”up” or ”down”, and hence in possession of its spin projection, prior to measurement.
In much the same sense we say that a massive object possess a weight, referring to
the weight value ν(w) a scale will read when the object is placed on it.This does not
conflict with the possibility that one scale gives a different reading from another;
one may speak of a body’s terrestrial weight, its weight on the moon, on mars,
etc.. A massive body, like the realist electron, is at all times in possession of an
infinite number of measurement values, the set of values that (for the body) weight
scales may measure for each of the infinitely many possible measurement situations.
These values are deterministically well-defined and so, given the object’s physical
characteristics and the deterministic factors acting upon it, the causal chain leading
up to the measurements, may be identified with that oject. By this identification
- in this sense - we say that the values are possessed by the object - weights of a
body, spin projections of an electron.
A body’s weight values might of course be determined from its mass, given the
relevant celestial masses and the law of gravity; in a world of weight measurements
18
however a statement of either is equivalent. Likewise, in absence of a knowledge of
some underlying electron spin and the dynamics of microscopic spin-measurements,
we may meaningfully identify a set of possible measurement results {ν(s)} with an
electron. Fundamental to the realist view is that an object’s possessed values are,
in principal, verifiable measurement values.
The description is compatible with the realist tenet that
Distinct phenomena supervene upon distinct causes only5. (21)
on which is based the EPR reality criterion
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (i.e.,
with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then there
exists an element of physical reality to this physical quantity.
which set the stage for their famous argument in defense of realism [9] and lead
eventually to the Bell inequality constraint on the same [10]. In Bell’s analysis, the
above description of electron possessed values {ν(s)} also appear, depending too
upon the manner in which the spin measurements are taken, their contexts. And it
is only upon stringent space-time constraints that context dependence is ruled out.
We now use the notation {ν(s)}′ to denote the set of electron spin projection values
measurable in context B, though possessed by the particle while in context B′ .
Similarly for the set of projector (yes-no) values
{ν(P)}′ ≡ {ν ′(P1), ν ′(P2), ...ν ′(Pn)} (22)
where ν ′(Pi) is the yes-no value for the i
th quantized direction (corresponding pro-
jector eigenvalues in descending order) of context B, possessed by a particle while
in context B′. We identify realist possessed values with QM operators in this nota-
tion only for the sake of comparison with QM expectation values with which they
sometime coincide; the value ν(P) simply answers the question whether or not a
5cf. opposing accounts of the ”realist view” in [6, p. 19] and [8, pp. 12-13]
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spin-measured quantum particle would scatter in the same direction as a classical
particle of spin s, and is not to be understood as a formal mapping of the QM pro-
jector P. The correlation between expected and experimental values is of primary
importance in the realist view, that between expected values and the QM formalism
(or any other) of secondary importance; the extent to which eigenvalues of a QM
operator are observed values is the same to which the realist possessed value ν(O)
is an eigenvalue of the QM operator O.
By realist extension of csr (18) to all contexts, then, we have:
ν ′(P1) + ν
′(P2) + ν
′(P3) = 1
ν ′(Pj) = 1 or 0 ∀ B′. (23)
Lastly, we may attribute to a hypothetical realist state function, one completely
describing the state of an individual particle, the complete set of the particle’s
possessed values
ψ = ψ[{{ν(P)}′}] ∀ B, B′. (24)
The realist particle thus represented by ψ has definite spin projections in all H-
spatial directions, simultaneously in all contexts.
5.2 Relation between realist ψ and QM Ψ
We symbolically represent the value assignment for an electron-spin measurement
〈ψ|S|ψ〉 = ν(s)→ ±1
2
. (25)
For sets of realist possessed values of mutually non-commuting contexts, however,
[Sθ,Sθ′] 6= 0 , (26)
QM predicts and observation confirms that a measurement of one set alters the
elements of the other; determination of such simultaneous possessed value sets is
therefore not possible.
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We illustrate a possible difficulty to realist thinking that this resolves by first revert-
ing back briefly to the former notation and consider the QM operational identity
Spi/4 = (S0 + Spi/2)/
√
2 (27)
with the above realist value assignments (23) applied to its QM expectation
〈Ψ|Spi/4|Ψ〉 = (〈Ψ|S0|Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|Spi/2|Ψ〉)/
√
2→ ±1
2
= (±1
2
± 1
2
)/
√
2 (28)
a statement manifestly false for all ± combinations. The mistake results from an
essential difference between the eigenvalues ν(O) and expectation values 〈Ψ|O|Ψ〉
of an operator O. We refer however to the use of relation (27) for its meaning
which lies in the agreement obtained between its expectation value and the exper-
imental average of measurements made upon many, many electrons for each of the
three indicated contexts, i.e. in an agreement with empirical relations between sub-
ensemble averages. In practice, then, (27) pertains to three entirely disjoint electron
sub-ensembles, each measured within one of the three contexts, {0, pi/4, pi/2}, so
that no single electron spin is measured more than once; the meaning of (27) derives
from the identification of quantum mechanical state functions Ψ with subensembles
[11], and not from a direct association with the possessed values of individual en-
semble members described by the realist ψ. With |Ψ〉 as the QM state function, the
expectation value relation
〈Ψ|Spi/4|Ψ〉 = (〈Ψ|S0|Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|Spi/2|Ψ〉)/
√
2 (29)
is found to correspond to the observed relation
S¯pi/4 = (S¯0 + S¯pi/2)/
√
2 (30)
where
S¯θ ≡ 1
2
(n+ − n−)/N (31)
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n± the number of ensemble electrons observed to deflect up/down in context θ, and
N = n+ + n− → ∞, the total number of electrons. Although the QM formalism
does not itself attach to its state functions a physical interpretation, in use Ψ is
clearly to be associated with sub-ensembles, in line with its realist interpretation 6.
An expansion of the QM Ψ over hypothetical realist electron states ψ might take
the form
|Ψ〉 = (n+|+〉θ + n−|−〉θ)/N
= (n1|s1〉+ n2|s2〉)/N (32)
with
|si〉 =
∑
{ν(Pi)=1}
|ψ[{ν(P′)}′′]〉 (33)
normalized to 1. Such an expansion leads immediately from the QM prediction
(29) to the observed (30). The terms averaged over, {ν(P′)}′′, with their contextual
dependence, may be understood as the sub-ensemble’s B-context hidden variables.
As Bˆ context eigenstates |si〉 will generally not have definite values in other contexts,
we have
0 ≤ 〈s′j |Pi|s′j〉 ≤ 1 (34)
although for realist possessed values
ν ′(Pi) = 1 or 0 ∀ B′. (35)
A QM state function |Ψ〉 of (32 ) on the other hand has definite values in at most one
context and is therefore said in the realist view to give a physically incomplete picture
of the individual electron. This difference forms the basis of our reconsideration of
the KS paradox in section 7.
6For an alternative and unconventional view see [12]. With regard to the special-case arguments
put forward there, one might also consider the special case of homogeneous ensembles.
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6 Kochen-Specker paradox
6.1 derivation of the paradox
In line with the discussion in section 5 the following might be proposed as a realist
proposition
p(1): All real state quantities (spin, mass, etc.) have definite values at
all times.
which is known as the principle of value-definiteness. Pairing with this a second
proposition
p(2): The value of a real quantity does not depend on how it is measured
called noncontextuality, and applying them together to the csr’s (23) draws a con-
tradiction in any Hilbert space of greater than two dimensions. As the Hilbert space
dimension for a particle of spin ”s” is given by 2s+1, KS shows that it is not possible
to apply both p(1) and p(2) consistently for a particle of spin s ≥ 1; this is the KS
paradox [13, 14].
Let us consider the simultaneous application of the propositions on (23). From p(1)
all equations and constraints hold simultaneously at this time
1. ν ′(P) = 0 or 1
2. for all B′
and from p(2) the values are independent of context:
1. ν ′(P) = ν ′′(P)→ ν(P).
In their original work the authors next proceed with a lengthy formal argument, a
simplification of which is the following :
The numbers ν(P) are the eigenvalues of Hilbert space vectors |sj〉. According to the
realist csr’s (23) it must then be possible to assign to each mutually orthogonal set
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of three vectors the values 0, 0, and 1. As the Hilbert space of QM state vectors, H3,
is complex, a violation of this rule in a Real space of the same dimension will suffice
for the negative proof of interest (R3 being a subset of H3). Note however that the
corresponding real vectors in the mapping QM : R3→ H3 ⊇ R3 (analogous to the
2-dimentional case pictured in figure 7) do not coincide.
To begin, KS show in the following way that two vectors separated by an angle
φ ≤ cos−1(√8/3) (36)
must have the same eigenvalue assignment, 0 or 1. Consider the three sets of mutu-
ally orthogonal triplets
{|s(1)1 >, |s(1)2 >, |s(1)3 >}, {|s(2)1 >, |s(2)2 >, |s(2)3 >}, {|s(3)1 >, |s(3)2 >, |s(3)3 >}(37)
in R3 together with a tenth, |s0 >, defined as
|s0 > = −xyi+ xj− k
|s(1)1 > = j+ xk
|s(1)2 > = i
|s(1)3 > = −xj + k
|s(2)1 > = yi− j
|s(2)2 > = i+ yj
|s(2)3 > = k
|s(3)1 > = −i− yj− xyk
|s(3)2 > = −y(1 + x2)i+ (1− x2y2)j + x(1 + y2)k
|s(3)3 > = −xy3(1 + x2)i+ x(1 + 2y2 + x2y2)j− (1 + y2)k (38)
for arbitrary numbers x & y. Now the angle φ between |s0 > and |s(3)3 > found from
their scalar product is given by relation
cos(φ) = [1 + x2 + y2 + x2y2(2 + x2 + y2 + x2y2)]/(||s0 > ||||s(3)3 > ||) (39)
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whose rhs minimization is directly found at
√
8/3, obtained for x = y = ±1. There-
fore, 0 ≤ φ ≤ cos−1(√8/3). In addition to the explicit vector triplet constraints
(23), by the same consequence, no perpendicular pair of vectors may be assigned
number ”1”, since taken together with a mutually perpendicular third they would
form a triplet. One finds then from the additional relations
|s0 > ⊥ |s(1)1 >, |s(2)2 >, and|s(3)2 >
|s(3)1 > ⊥ |s(1)3 > and|s(2)1 >
|s(1)2 > ⊥ |s(2)3 > (40)
that the only possible assignments for the set of ten are those for which |s0 > and
|s(3)3 > have the same eigenvalue, ν(P0) = ν(P(3)3 ) = 0 or 1, demonstrated by simply
trying out each of the other two possible assignments while respecting constraints
implicit in (37) and (40). As only the relative |s0 > to |s(3)3 > directions are relevant,
the result establishes for KS that in realist thinking any two vectors in R3 of angular
separation 0 ≤ φ ≤ cos−1(√8/3) must have the same eigenvalue assignment, 0 or 1.
We now take the full set {|s(j)i >} of (38) for φ = 18o(< cos−1(
√
8/3)), and for
convenience perform a rotation on the coordinate system such that |s(3)2 > points
along the positive y-axis and |s0 > along the positive z-axis. We show here three
key vectors of the set scaled to 100, and table triplets according to context Bˆi.
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xy|s >2(3)
z
|s >3(3)
18o
|s >0
-60,67,44
-74,-67,0
-29,32,-90
-23,-67,-71
-77,-32,56
-60,67,-44
95,0,-31
0,100,0
31,0,95
B1 B2 B3
figure 11
From these we generate four new sets of nine vectors by rotating the original about
|s(3)2 > in four 18o increments, constraining successive |s(3)3 >’s thereby to the same
value assignment, and generate five additional sets by first rotating the last set by
90o about its |s(15)3 >, then rotating in five more 18o increments about the rotated
|s(15)2 > . For a final five we follow the same procedure to complete the first-quadrant
sweep of |s3 >: |s(15)3 > (= |s(33)2 >) → |s(30)3 > (= |s(3)2 >) → |s(45)3 > (= |s(18)2 >) ,
on the {ˆi, jˆ, kˆ} triad
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x|s  >2(33)
y
|s >2(3)
z
|s  >2(18)
figure 12
each element of which, again, constrained to the same value assignment. But this
immediately violates csr’s (23) as {ˆi, jˆ, kˆ} is itself a mutually perpendicular triplet.
The violation is taken to demonstrate an inconsistency in the realist conception of
reality as given by propositions p(1) and p(2) and thus concludes the KS paradox.
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This result may also be illustrated visually. For the tabular form [14] consider first
the vectors involved in the 15 orientations of the set of 9 as represented in figure
(12); we list here the total 117 vectors ( = 15× 9 − 15− 3, accounting also for the
15 |s2 > and 3 |s3 > overlaps ), sub-grouping as in figure (11) according to context
B1 B2 B3
( −60,67,44 )
( −74,−67,0 )
( −29,32,−90 )
( −23,−67,−71 )
( −77,−32,56 )
( −60,67,−44 )
( 95,0,−31 )
( 0,100,0 )
( 31,0,95 )
B16 B17 B18
( 44,−60,67 )
( 0,−74,−67 )
( −90,−29,32 )
( −71,−23,−67 )
( 56,−77,−32 )
( −44,−60,67 )
( −31,95,0 )
( 0,0,100 )
( 95,31,0 )
B31 B32 B33
( 67,44,−60 )
( −67,0,−74 )
( 32,−90,−29 )
( −67,−71,−23 )
( −32,56,−77 )
( 67,−44,−60 )
( 0,−31,95 )
( 100,0,0 )
( 0,95,31 )
B4 B5 B6
( −44,67,60 )
( −71,−67,23 )
( −56,32,−77 )
( −44,−67,−60 )
( −56,−32,77 )
( −71,67,−23 )
( 81,0,−59 )
( 0,100,0 )
( 59,0,81 )
B19 B20 B21
( 60,−44,67 )
( 23,−71,−67 )
( −77,−56,32 )
( −60,−44,−67 )
( 77,−56,−32 )
( −23,−71,67 )
( −59,81,0 )
( 0,0,100 )
( 81,59,0 )
B34 B35 B36
( 67,60,−44 )
( −67,23,−71 )
( 32,−77,−56 )
( −67,−60,−44 )
( −32,77,−56 )
( 67,−23,−71 )
( 0,−59,81 )
( 100,0,0 )
( 0,81,59 )
B7 B8 B9
( −23,67,71 )
( −60,−67,44 )
( −77,32,−56 )
( −60,−67,−44 )
( −29,−32,90 )
( −74,67,0 )
( 59,0,−81 )
( 0,100,0 )
( 81,0,59 )
B22 B23 B24
( 71,−23,67 )
( 44,−60,−67 )
( −56,−77,32 )
( −44,−60,−67 )
( 90,−29,−32 )
( 0,−74,67 )
( −81,59,0 )
( 0,0,100 )
( 59,81,0 )
B37 B38 B39
( 67,71,−23 )
( −67,44,−60 )
( 32,−56,−77 )
( −67,−44,−60 )
( −32,90,−29 )
( 67,0,−74 )
( 0,−81,59 )
( 100,0,0 )
( 0,59,81 )
B10 B11 B12
( 0,67,74 )
( −44,−67,60 )
( −90,32,−29 )
( −71,−67,−23 )
( 0,−32,95 )
( −71,67,23 )
( 31,0,−95 )
( 0,100,0 )
( 95,0,31 )
B25 B26 B27
( 74,0,67 )
( 60,−44,−67 )
( −29,−90,32 )
( −23,−71,−67 )
( 95,0,−32 )
( 23,−71,67 )
( −95,31,0 )
( 0,0,100 )
( 31,95,0 )
B40 B41 B42
( 67,74,0 )
( −67,60,−44 )
( 32,−29,−90 )
( −67,−23,−71 )
( −32,95,0 )
( 67,23,−71 )
( 0,−95,31 )
( 100,0,0 )
( 0,31,95 )
B13 B14 B15
( 23,67,71 )
( −23,−67,71 )
( −95,32,0 )
( −74,−67,0 )
( 29,−32,90 )
( −60,67,44 )
( 0,0,−100 )
( 0,100,0 )
( 100,0,0 )
B28 B29 B30
( 71,23,67 )
( 71,−23,−67 )
( 0,−95,32 )
( 0,−74,−67 )
( 90,29,−32 )
( 44,−60,67 )
( −100,0,0 )
( 0,0,100 )
( 0,100,0 )
B43 B44 B45
( 67,71,23 )
( −67,71,−23 )
( 32,0,−95 )
( −67,0,−74 )
( −32,90,29 )
( 67,44,−60 )
( 0,−100,0 )
( 100,0,0 )
( 0,0,100 )
table 4
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Then from the following rules
1. The eigenvector whose projector has value 1(0) is assigned the color white
(black).
2. Two orthogonal vectors may not both be colored white.
3. The assignments are independent of context.
we attempt to color the vector boxes of table 4. That the coloring assignments cannot
be made consistently in accordance with the rules coincides with the paradox.
Finally, for a two-dimensional graphical form of the paradox [15] we represent vectors
by small open circles, and orthogonality between pairs of vectors by a connecting
straight line; a triangle with open circles at the vertices then represents a mutually
orthogonal triplet, and our beginning set of vectors described in figure (11) has the
KS diagram representation
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| s2(1) >
| s3(2) >
| s2(3) >
| s1(1) >| s3(1) >
| s2(2) >| s1(2) >
| s0 >| s1(3) >
| s3(3) >
figure 13
Here the constraint that |s0 > and |s(3)3 > have the same eigenvalue assignment for
example follows from the inability to assign different colors to their circled vertices
in accordance with the aforementioned coloring scheme for the corresponding vector
boxes. If we then stretch the diagram a little to one side
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| s0 >
| s3(3) >
| s2(3) >
figure 14
and perform the 14 rotations about the appropriate |s2 > points (along with the
two rotations about |s3 > points) as represented in figure 12, we generate the full
KS diagram
31
| s2(18) >
| s2(33) > | s2(3) >
figure 15
said to resemble a cat’s cradle. Here too, the inability to faithfully apply the coloring
scheme to individual circled vertices is understood as a manifestation of inconsis-
tency in tealist thinking on microscopic measurement. The difficulties presented by
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these two visualizations are known as the KS coloring problem.
6.2 Von Neumann’s paradox and resolution
In the Summer of 1932 eminent physicist and mathematician J. von Neumann de-
vised a proof (VN) against the possibility of a consistent realist interpretation of
QM [16], a precursor of the KS paradox, by way of the operator avarage relation
A = B+C ⇒ 〈Ψ|A|Ψ〉 = 〈Ψ|B|Ψ〉+ 〈Ψ|C|Ψ〉 (41)
similar to our equation (28) above. Operators B and C here do not commute, and
the rhs terms are assumed to take on realist possessed values [7, p. 268]. This last
condition is the VN additivity postulate P.IV from which derives the expectation
value formula
〈O〉 = Tr(WO) (42)
where Tr is the trace operator and W a statistical operator independent of observable
O and descriptive of the system under observation. For the hypothetical value-
definite states ψ, so-called ”dispersion -free” states
〈ψ|O2|ψ〉 − 〈ψ|O|ψ〉2 = 0 (43)
in the language of the time, the formula proves problematic in the following way: The
statistical operator describing the realist system ψ is just the projectorWψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Choosing for O then an arbitrary projector |φ〉〈φ| leads from (42) and (43) to the
statement
〈φ|Wψ|φ〉 = 0 or 1 (44)
for all possible QM states φ which cannot be true as the left-hand side is continuous
in φ and the right hand side discontinuous. This cast doubts on the very existence
of dispersion-free states Wψ
7.
7I don’t know that its been pointed out in the literature [17] that the above lhs continuity is
consequent upon a separate application of additivity by which two dispersion-free states of opposite
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This VN impossibility proof has long been understood to follow from a misappli-
cation of its additivity postulate 8 which is experimentally valid for expectation
values, though, as shown in section 5.2, not applicable to real-possessed values. The
violation follows from simple statistics: ensemble values (∼ Ψ2 ) are generally not
identical with ensemble-member values ( ∼ ψ2). The Von Neumann paradox rests
upon an illicit application of proposition p(1) to quantum mechanical sub-ensembles
via equations of QM which Ψ alone satisfies:
Ψ + p(1) ⇒ VN Paradox
( Ψ implying p(2) ). It has the schematic resolution
Ψ→ ψ
or equally well,
p(1) → p(2).
We have then
ψ + p(1)
or
Ψ + p(2)


⇒ no VN Paradox (45)
6.3 Gleason’s result
In response to the objectionable additivity postulate necessary to the VN proof,
A. M. Gleason derived the main there formula (42) by means of an acceptable ad-
ditivity for commuting operators [18], as appears e.g. in the above csr’s (23), in
eigenvalues, ψ1 andψ0, are joined by a connecting vector Ψ(x) = axψ0 + bxψ1, for properly chosen
functions ax and bx ( See e.g. reference [7, p. 294] ). Such an operator, O = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is not
an observable in the Hilbert space of dispersion-free states under consideration. In light of this,
the von Neumann proof might be understood to follow from an assumption, under additivity,
of the existence of dispersive states in, under realism, the Hilbert space of dispersive-free states:
〈ψ|Ψ〉 = 0 or 1 for all Ψ.
8See J. Bell, ref.[11]. A more thorough exposition is given in [6, pp. 25-34]
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addition to a tacit assumption of noncontextuality first noticed only years later
by Bell [11]. By demonstrating via (42) the necessary continuity of mappings
from H3 and higher dimensions to R1, i.e. that Hilbert space projection opera-
tors Pi are mapped continuously onto the closed interval [1,0], Gleason proves under
noncontextuality the impossibility of the realist necessarily discontinuous mapping
ν : P → R1, ν(P) = 0 or 1 , and so the non-existence of ψ and an inconsistency in
realist hidden variable theories. The key result of Kochen and Specker, constraint
(36) , then gives an upper-bound estimate on the ν ′(φ) implicit to noncontextual
value-definite hidden variable theories.
7 the KS paradox reconsidered
The KS proof improves on the VN proof in that it in effect applies the constraints of
value definiteness, proposition p(1), appropriately to the hypothetical realist state
function ψ (∼ ν ). Proposition p(2), noncontextuality, on the other hand has largely
been inferred indirectly as an extension to realist thinking. For example, from
Einstein’s rhetorical
Do you believe the moon is really there if no one is looking? [19] (e)
which suggests an independence of reality from its observation.
Let us briefly take a closer look. As the statement addresses the question of ex-
istence itself, the observation-independence or noncontextuality inferred from it is
ontological9: There is an objective reality ”out there” with an existence indepen-
dent of observation 10. The aforementioned reality criterion of section 5.1, how-
ever concerns an observation dependence of a different, more mundane sort: The
observation-dependence of states of existence, of states (which addresses e.g. the
9Ontological in the sense that it concerns the principles and causes of being.... Unfortunately
for the writer, the term ”ontological contextualism” is already in use [20] though with a meaning
it seems closer to that of causal contextuality. I use it here sparingly in the first sense.
10See e.g. K. Popper in ref.[21, p. 2]
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question whether an electron’s spin is affected by an observation of it ), not of the
very existence of the thing observed. The clear indication is that, notwithstanding
the select elements that meet the reality criterion - a sufficient criterion - the value of
a physical quantity does indeed depend upon how it is obtained, upon the manner in
which the object under observation is affected, disturbed during measurement. Such
a contextual dependence is causal and the values thus measured causally contextual
- precisely the sort of effect that experimentalists in EPR tests go to great lengths to
guard against [22]. As J. Bell writes, ”The result of an observation may reasonably
depend not only on the state of the system... but also on the complete disposition
of the [measuring] apparatus.” [11]. But these categories are confused in the KS
and Gleason analysis, realist dismissal of ontological contextuality misinterpreted
as a dismissal of causal contextuality, leading, finally, to mistaking p(2) as a realist
proposition.
While the von Neumann proof relies on an explicit misapplication of realist value-
definiteness within the QM formalism, as shown in 5.1, in its misapplication of
additivity via the equations of QM such as (27) to realist states ψ, it is also seen to
violate causal contextuality; in the single QM expectation-value equation (29) the
relevant contextual effects are washed out in the average. KS and Gleason achieve
the same ends by means of properly single context equations, though several taken
simultaneously in terms of the csr’s of (23) for mutually exclusive contexts. And
so in principle both commit the same violation in unduly constraining the most
general causality. Again, to illustrate, there is nothing in realist thinking on the
spin-1 measurements
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(θ− θ′ = 90o) to suggest the counterfactual implied in the noncontextual constraint
ν(P1) = ν
′(P2) ( or, with reference to figure 10, the constraint ν(P2) = ν
′(P2) ).
The KS diagram of figure (15) describes a set of experiments each of which may in
principle be performed; accordingly, the diagram itself may always be constructed.
Its coloring however depends somewhat upon interpretation of QM wavefunction.
While both orthodox and realist interpretations achieve coloring consistency by
means of various shadings, indeed in violation of the coloring rules, their mecha-
nisms differ: Indeterminism on one hand, causal contextuality on the other. At
issue here is the KS contention that while orthodox coloring is constrained only by
the rules governing individual triplets, those that might be derived from the csr (18),
realist coloring is constrained by the full KS set.
Proposition p(2) from which in combination with p(1) the rules follow does not
properly apply to individual ensemble-member values, realist possessed values ν,
and it is precisely this misapplication that is at the heart of the KS paradox.
The paradox may thus be understood from the following schematic:
ψ + p(2) ⇒ KS Paradox
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(ψ implying p(1) ). It is resolved by the replacement
ψ → Ψ
Taken together then
Ψ + p(2)
or
ψ + p(1)


⇒ no KS Paradox (46)
8 conclusion
While quantum mechanics is generally accepted as the best tool available for the
prediction of small-scale statistics, there remains disagreement over its physical in-
terpretation particularly as regards its Hilbert-space state vectors. In the prevailing
orthodox view Ψ is said to represent individual systems e.g. an individual electron
of an ensemble. It is understood in consequence that individual systems cannot
consistently possess many of the common characteristics we attribute to them in or-
dinary language use (spatial position, mass, spin, etc.). The conceptual challenges
presented by the view are obvious and well-known and an entire culture in science
thinking has gone to their explication [21, 7]. While this particular concept does
indeed appear common to all orthodox-school thinking we caution not to overgener-
alize with regard what is really a diversity of views [23]. Likewise in characterizing
the realist view 11 , particularly as impossibility proofs such as the ones here reviewed
are directed against their very logic. Let us therefore carefully consider again the
type of experimental arrangement cited earlier in illustration of realist thinking on
the fundamental issue here, noncontextuality.
For the pair of illustrated spin-1 projection measurements
11See refs.[15, p. 44] and [6, p. 9]
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one always has the possessed-value relations
ν(P1) + ν(P2) + ν(P3) = 1 (47)
and
ν ′(P′1) + ν
′(P′2) + ν
′(P′3) = 1 (48)
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We ask now whether in the realist view a result of measuring the projection P2 = P
′
2
may depend upon how the measurement is taken. Whether
ν(P2) = ν
′(P′2) (49)
by necessity. Based on statements of the generality (e) above KS assumes that the
realist view answers in the affirmative, the claim (not to beat a dead horse) at the
heart of the derivation of their paradox, as shown in section 6.1.
But the question is not unique to experimental arrangements of the type pictured
in figure (17). The very same also appears in Bell -Inequality (BI) analysis [11] in
the context of the question of space-time locality 12. There, a set of fixed projec-
tion measurements is taken (by detector D1 at space-time position x ) on spin-1/2
particles, as the setting of a remote apparatus (D2 at y ) is varied
12There, it is certainly true that what is to the realist view a question of contextuality (of
the possible effects of D2, ψ2, etc. on ψ1 , assuming separability - that the effects between paired
particles are purely causal) is to the orthodox view one of separability only ( roughly, of the affects
of decay particle ψ2 on particle ψ1 intrinsic to their bound state ). Hence e.g. the realist issue
with detector D2 triggering.
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One then considers contextuality question, whether
νk(P1) = ν
′
k
(P1) (50)
where here too value subscripts and superscripts in obvious notation characterize
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the measurement context 13.
An affirmative answer without condition leads as is well-known to an realization of
the Bell inequality and immediate disagreement of realism with observation. And no
one has thought to do this. On the contrary, contextuality is assumed as a matter
of course, its possible effect dismissed only upon satisfaction of the most stringent
locality conditions
(x− y)2 > 1 (51)
brought to some level of experimental realization in the work of Aspect et al and
several refinements since [22]. We are keen to make this point, as (to continue
the beating) causal contextuality is indeed central to realist thinking particularly
since the appearance of quantum phenomena and the realist conceptual involvement
of hidden variables. D. Bohm confirms that ” when we measure the momentum
’observable,’ the final result is determined by hidden parameters in the momentum-
measuring device as well as by hidden parameters in the observed electron” [24]. N.
Bohr also, himself no realist, agrees 14, while others, more often than not on purely
formalistic grounds, may not [26]. We conclude therefore that the value-definiteness
of realism p(1) is in no way incompatible with causal contextuality not-p(2) but is
on the contrary complemented by it 15.
If figure(18) by comparison with (17) (in light of constraint (51)) is taken to indicate
an experimental constraint appropriate to noncontextuality in the KS analysis, the
13While it is possible for individual states and measurements (ψ, ν) to depend upon context while
those of ensembles (Ψ, 〈 〉) remain independent, or noncontextual, Bell’s inequality is concerned
with ensemble contextuality (that of Ψ ) though by way of individual state contextuality (that of
ψ ). The KS paradox on the other hand treats the contextuality of individual states.
14”This crucial point... implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behavior
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the
conditions under which the phenomena appear.”, Ref. [25, p. 209]
15Without naming it, as the term had yet to enter the language, Belinfante offers in part 1 of
reference [6] (up to page 78) an excellent insight into contextual thinking. Likewise Bell [11], the
first to notice contextuality as an issue central to the KS paradox. There are many others.
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feasibility of such a test seems clearly in doubt. We will not persue the question
here.
What is striking about the realist view of possessed values is its marked lack of
novelty. The possessed values of an electron are thought to be no different in their
manner of possession than tose of tables, trees, cats; a stone said to possess 10 kilo-
grams is said in the same breath to weigh 98 Newtons, to oscillate with a frequency
f = 1
2pi
√ k
10
when attached to a spring k, and so forth; i.e., such a stone possesses
all the values that a stone of 10 kilograms might yield upon measurement, many of
which from the laws of mechanics may be known before hand.... To say that the
stone is 10 kilograms is a manner of speaking, a shorthand for an otherwise unwieldy
usage.
In absence such a shorthand however one is left with the directly observed or pre-
dicted values themselves, no less possessed by the object. In this form they may
well appear in some ways peculiar and to have unusual properties 16 . They do
not; and the appearance generally dissolves upon careful consideration: Again, the
manner of microscopic property possession in this view is no different than that for
macroscopic possession.
It has long been considered not possible to assign definite values to systems whose
possessed values are described by noncommuting QM operators. The KS paradox
proves this for a discrete set of observables and as such is a statement of the limitation
of QM to predict individual microscopic phenomena. But the paradox is not a proper
criticism of realist thinking; it reduces to absurdity a view held by no one.
16van Fraassen’s ontological contextualism has taken special ridicule for its proliferation of pos-
sessed values that e.g. ”pop in and out of existence” at the whim of the experimentalist [14],
”de-Ockhamizing QM!” [15, p. 135] . Such a criticism on mathematical form, Bell might have
countered, merely betrays a lack of sufficient imagination [28, p. 64]. Einstein too was largely
unconcerned with formal structures per se [7, pp. 234-238] .
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